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PROBLEMS OF FAMILY PLANNING AMONGST AFRICANS IN
RHODESIA*
D. G. CLARKE
Amongst current development problems facing Rhodesia that of a high 
rate of population growth must be regarded as one of the most fundamental 
in its effects on the immediate short-term and long-term economic and social 
welfare of a large proportion of the country’s population. Whereas most of the 
country’s other problems can be solved by means of judicious planning and 
institutional and political adjustment, the disabilities and strains imposed 
upon the economy by the prevailing demographic structure cannot be easily 
negotiated towards a rapid solution. Instead, demographic influences will 
retain a permanence, for the purposes of prospective economic policy, irrespec­
tive of the prevailing political order. For this reason the relative lack of effective 
attention that the population problem has received from policy makers is not 
only alarming for the country’s future economic prosperity but also requires 
some explanation.
The purpose of this paper, therefore, will be to draw attention to Rhodesia’s 
present demographic structure, to relate its significance to the economic pro­
blems of unemployment and income distribution and to highlight a number 
of the factors that impede the promotion, adoption and effectiveness of a 
comprehensive family planning programme.
The Demographic Structure
The first striking feature of the Rhodesian population structure is the 
contrast in the demographic stages of the different racial groups. Numerically, 
the African population is the dominant group with the latest estimates1 being 
5 220 000. Next in size is the European population of 249 000, followed by a 
Coloured population of 16 900 and an Asian group of 9 300. Thus, over 95 
per cent of the population are African and it is primarily in relation to this 
group that the question of population growth has most relevance and to which 
the analysis that follows is addressed. This does not mean to say that the 
effects of population change within the non-African community have little 
economic significance for the rest of the country or vice-versa. In fact, the 
contrary holds true, for it is the intricate economic relationships and inter­
dependence of the racial groups in the economic sphere that is at the heart of 
present development problems.
It is not only the racial population ratios that lead one to focus on the 
African population when speaking about demographic problems in Rhodesia. 
Differential rates of natural increase, dissimilar historical trends in birth rates 
and death rates and markedly contrasting age structures accentuate the divisions 
suggested by the numerical balance.
The birth rate and the natural rate of increase for Europeans have both 
fallen sharply since 1954 while death rates have remained relatively stable at 
the low level of 6 or 7 per 1 000 of population. The community finds itself at 
an advanced stage of the demographic cycle; this is a function of the com­
munity’s immigrant origins, economic modernity, high income status and close 
associations with population groups in economically advanced countries.
* I am indebted to I. R. E. Spilhaus, former Director of the Family Plannin g Association (Rhodesia) 
for making available the records of the organization for research purposes, and to P. S. Harris for 
a number of valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Responsibility for any remaining 
errors remains with the writer.
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Further, immigration serves as an important source of population growth and 
affects both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the European labour 
force.
The Asian population group can be viewed in a similar manner. Numbers 
are small, even in relation to the European population, and the natural rate 
of increase of 1,7 per cent per annum is less than 50 per cent of the African 
rate. Likewise with the Coloured community, with the exception that the annual 
rate of population increase considerably exceeds the African rate.2
It therefore appears logical to group the Asian, Coloured and European 
population in a separate category for research that is beyond the scope en­
visaged in this paper. This should not, however, obscure the need for con­
sideration of appropriate population policies amongst the non-African com­
munities and their repercussions for the welfare of the total population of the 
country.
Recorded official data relating to the African population indicates a rela­
tively rapid rise in the net natural rate of increase since 1948. At that time 
the birth rate was put at 46,2 per 1 000 and the death rate of 18,1 per 1 000 
giving a growth rate of 2,81 per cent per annum.2 By 1954 the natural rate of 
increase was 3,04 per cent,4 mainly the result of a fall in the death rate to 14,4 
per 1 000, and in 1962 this was revised upwards, on the data made available 
in the first census of the African population,5 to 3,40 per cent per annum 
with the birth rate estimated as 48,0 per 1 000. The final results of the 1969 
census have not yet been processed but preliminary data have been released. 
Again there has been an upward revision of the rate of natural increase, this 
time to 3,6 per cent per annum, but in contrast to previous trends both the 
birth rate and the death rate are reported to have risen since 1962 from 48 to 
52 per 1 000 in the former instance and from 14 to 16 per 1 000 in the case of 
the latter.6 The proportion of the population in the economically inactive 
age groups is indicative of the economic problems produced by the unfavour­
able age structure and the consequences of current high rates of natural in­
crease. In 1962 an estimated 46,6 per cent of the population were in the 0-14 
age group and in 1969 preliminary results indicate that this has risen to 49,6 
per cent.7 Set against a background of existing rural poverty, relative stag­
nation of the economy in the period 1959-1968 in terms of income per head,5 
low rates of growth of employment in the modern sector of the economy, a 
markedly inequalitarian and increasingly unsatisfactory income distribution» 
(particularly against the rural sector), and institutional and political impedi­
ments1® to the economic advancement of Africans, it will be readily appre­
ciated that population growth makes a negative contribution to the overall 
economic status of the African population and that this predicament is likely 
to become increasingly severe in the future.
Downward movements in the African birth rate are likely to be slow and 
forthcoming only with rapid economic growth and when comprehensive 
family planning services are effectively within the grasp of those who most 
urgently need them. Within the country regional differentials in rates of popu­
lation growth, birth rates and death rates do exist.11 Part of the difficulty 
with the present embryonic family planning services is that resources are thinly 
spread and not within the immediate reach of a large proportion of the African 
population.
Migration is also an important cause of change in the structure of the 
African population. The picture regarding the movement of foreign African
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males is one of gradual reduction in numbers, in absolute and relative terms, 
since 1955.12 The main economic consequence of these population move­
ments can be traced to the labour supply and demand conditions that have 
prevailed in the Agricultural and Mining sectors where more than 50 per cent 
of the estimated 200000 foreign workers in 1970 are employed.1J Apart from 
providing a low cost supply of labour for these sectors and acting as an ele­
ment that restrains wage increases in other sectors, this group exhibits different 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics from the balance of the 
African population. In 1962 some 11,2 per cent of the African population were 
born outside Rhodesia. By 1969 this figure stood at 7,5 per cent of whom 
239 160 were males and 98 680 females.14 Many foreign Africans are employed 
in low productivity occupations, earn low incomes, remit funds home under 
agreements signed between the Rhodesian and respective home country 
governments, and are employed on short-term contracts, often for a specified 
period of two years. Approximately 64 per cent of non-indigenous Africans 
in 1969 had entered the country since 1950 and 15,7 per cent since 1965. Thus 
a considerable proportion have resided in the country longer than 20 years. 
The continued presence of foreign Africans in the country is a little uncertain. 
No explicit government policy of repatriation exists, although the de facto 
operations of the Rhodesian Labour Supply Commission, economic pressures 
within the country having their major effects in those sectors in which the con­
centration of foreign Africans is particularly high, and a growing unemploy­
ment and under-employment problem amongst the African population in 
general, tend to indicate that a continued net emigration is likely for the future. 
The rate of emigration is, however, unpredictable and subject to administrative, 
economic and political variables which cannot be accurately forecast.
It can, therefore, be observed that the major demographic variable that 
will influence the economic well being of Rhodesia’s African population is the 
birth rate. Death rates could in the long term be reduced by some 50 per cent, 
perhaps, if one is to accept the existing death rate level of the European popu­
lation as a likely outcome of any increased medical expenditures, improved 
incomes, and the effect of spreading knowledge of preventive medicine. A birth 
rate of 52 per 1 000 is well above levels of 18 per 1 000 that are experienced in 
advanced countries and amongst economically advanced groups within develop­
ing countries. It is only in a fundamental reversal of the trend in the birth rate 
as rapidly as possible that Rhodesia can hope to forestall further declines in 
the real standard of living of the majority of her population. Quite clearly there 
appears to be little movement in that direction at present and it will take a 
massive programme over a long period to start the process going, especially 
if the increases in rural poverty that have characterized economic development 
in the country over the last decade continue unchecked.
For this reason there is eminent logic in a family planning programme 
being accompanied by extensive rural development schemes aimed at raising 
rural incomes. Early initiatives in this latter regard under the auspices of the 
Land Husbandry Act of 1951, the Community Development policy initiated 
since 1965 and lately through the Tribal Trust Land Development Corpora­
tion, launched in 1967, have proven inadequate in scope, orientation and 
financial underpinning. The problem is also related to discriminating practices 
and policies operative in Rhodesia, both with respect to employment policies 
in the modern sector and the reservation of some 48 per cent of the land in the 
country for the small European population group, a high percentage of whom 
are resident in urban areas.
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The significant wealth and income differentials that exist between the 
racial groups and between the rural African community and the rest of the 
African population place definite practical limits on the mobilization of econo­
mic resources for the development of the low income, rural based, African 
community. However, such a subject requires more extensive treatment than 
can be made in the present paper and accordingly the discussion to follow 
selects only a few aspects of the development problem, viz., those which work 
to impede the establishment, effectiveness and acceptance of comprehensive 
family planning as a basis for a national population policy at the present time.
Obstacles to Family Planning: Economic
The obstacles to family planning amongst Africans in Rhodesia can be 
grouped into four broad headings—economic, financial, sociological and 
political.
At the individual level, especially for the low income rural African in the 
Tribal Trust Land areas, and to a lesser extent in the Purchase Areas where 
economic conditions tend to be more favourable, there is a considerable degree 
of personal confidence, that may seem misplaced to casual external observers, 
in the logic of a large family size. The individual farmer already has a low 
income, close to subsistence. Most of this is taken up in consumption, the 
balance being invested in the education of one or more of his children, usually 
the males first, or in some other asset form, varying from small deposits in 
rural banking agencies to less sophisticated and more traditional investments 
in additional livestock. Because the family is still the basic unit of production 
and the maximization of family income is an identifiable objective, the house­
hold head, or young males, or both, may seek to earn income in urban areas, 
or in other wage employment sectors of the economy. While a host of factors 
(personal, economic and sociological) govern the distribution of time and 
effort spent in earning this part of the family’s aggregate income—this being 
determined by the relative effort price of income earned in other pursuits15— 
the important point remains that not only does the existence of additional 
children increase aggregate family income and the expectation that one of the 
migiants in the family will be fortunate in securing a high earning job, but a 
large number of children would also increase the expectation and continuity 
of cash remittances.
This does not mean to say that all these events need necessarily take place 
in accordance with expectation but only that this state of affairs represents the 
expected probability facing the individual. Indeed, it may be true that should 
economic conditions change adversely and these be recognized objectively by 
the individual, for instance in the case of increasing unemployment in urban 
areas, it may well still be to the individual’s advantage to have more children, 
even though on a macro-economic level the increase in population would only 
aggravate already critical employment and social conditions. Apart from these 
economic incentives to procreate there are added advantages, given traditional 
African social customs, in having children to provide for parents in their old 
age, in case of disability or misfortune. Thus, whatever the social cost of exces­
sive rates of population growth in terms of budgetary cost per annum for 
education and health, for example, the private gains for the individual decision 
maker and household head in the subsistence sector in terms of expected income 
and social security are both significant and crucial when related to existing 
rural income levels and the operative framework of the economy. It is, there­
fore, possible to appreciate the divergence in micro and macro assessments
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of the population growth phenomenon. From a national viewpoint the accep­
tance of a rapid rate of population growth seems widely at variance with 
rational priorities for economic growth but from the subjective perspective of 
an individual African farmer, migrant, or even urban dweller, this estimate 
need not necessarily hold true. Consequently, considerable inertia, based on a 
divergence of the private and social net costs of a high rate of population 
growth, is often experienced amongst certain groups in accepting the need for 
family limitation. It appears unlikely that these assessments will alter without 
compensation for welfare losses sustained as a result of change in socio­
economic behaviour.
A second economic trend that is likely to reinforce the maintenance of the 
high birth rate, rather than operate to reduce it, is the stagnation of rural 
African incomes experienced over the last 16 years. It can be seen from national 
accounts data16 that the earnings of the African rural household sector, com­
prising an estimated 60 per cent of the African population, have declined 
significantly over the period 1954-1970. Income from sales of produce to the 
market sector of the economy (representing the main ingredient of cash income 
above subsistence consumption), has fluctuated between a lower level of £2,8 
million in 1968 and an upper level of £5,6 million in 1956 (measured in current 
prices) for the period 1954-1968, while at the same time the rate of growth of 
the rural population has been both positive and high. The inevitable result, as 
Sutcliffe I ’ has shown, is that rural black income per capita has been steadily 
declining from £14,4 in 1954 to £11,2 in 1968 (1964 prices). Given more difficult 
economic conditions the average rural household will be encouraged to protect 
itself, on the basis of maximizing security and minimizing risk, by maintaining 
or increasing its size. The evidence of increasing birth rates over the period 
1954-1970 bears out this hypothesis. Until the adverse distributional trends in 
income against the rural sector in both absolute and relative terms can be 
checked and reversed it would be ambitious to expect significant reductions 
in the birth rate, particularly in as much as these declines in fertility would be 
expected to result from the process of economic growth and increasing income. 
By comparison with the rural population the urban African population have 
enjoyed a relatively strong secular increase in wages and salaries and in growth 
of income per head. From an income per capita of £30,9 in 1954 Sutcliffe 
estimates that the increase by 1968 was approximately 64 per cent, giving an 
urban income per head of £50,9 (1964 prices) at that time.18 It is more likely, 
though data is fragmentary on this point, that the potential for declines in the 
birth rate is better in urban areas, and amongst the wage employed sector, not 
only because of the effect of higher and secularly rising incomes, the effect of 
urbanization and industrialization and the higher cost of dependents in urban 
centres, but also because of the higher average level of education, literacy and 
comprehension of family planning in the towns vis-a-vis the more remote and 
traditionally orientated rural communities.
This does not imply that reductions in the net rate of natural increase 
must necessarily be expected in urban areas for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
it is likely that with the greater proximity and availability of medical facilities 
urban area death rates will be lower than in rural areas. Secondly, knowledge 
of modern clinical family planning techniques tend to be more widely spread 
in urban areas but the coverage of family planning clinics in urban areas at 
this stage cannot be regarded as comprehensive and so the effects may be 
limited. Further, the intensification of family planning programmes for Africans 
has only become prominent in recent years and more particularly since the
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Family Planning Association began successfully soliciting more substantial 
financial support from public authorities. Very little of this actually relates to 
the period 1948-1965 in which increases in the birth rate have been marked. 
Thirdly, it is easy to overestimate the magnitude of the growth of income per 
head in the urban area when comparison is made with rural income levels. In 
fact, in comparison to the income levels of the European, Asian or Coloured 
communities the levels are still very low and relatively sizeable percentage 
gains from year to year reflect to a considerable degree the small base on 
which annual absolute increases are computed. Finally, there is evidence in 
Urban Budget Surveys conducted by the Central Statistical Office at irregular 
intervals over the period 1958-1968, that increases in the urban household 
size have occurred that cannot be attributed solely to in-migration from rural 
areas. It can at best be assumed that increases in the birth rate for urban areas 
have been lower than in rural areas while it is possible that death rates may be 
declining more rapidly in urban centres and by corollary that death rates in 
rural areas have increased in the 1962-69 period. Unfortunately, there is little 
evidence available at present to trace the cause of this phenomenon, since 
published data do not disaggregate attendance at clinic and hospitals on a 
regional basis.
Another economic impediment, but also related to the political structure 
of the country and the social attitudes of African parents, is the effect of a low 
level of education amongst the existing adult population group and future 
members of this group as represented by children presently under 15 years of 
age. Many of the former group have little formal education. This problem is 
proportionately greater in the rural compared to urban areas. In 1962 the 
Census showed that of adult males born between 1918 and 1945 some 42,2 
per cent had never been to school, 4,9 per cent were still at school, 36,8 per 
cent left school at Standard III or before, while only 3,1 per cent had progressed 
beyond Standard VI. For females the equivalent figures were 52,8 per cent, 
3,0 per cent, 36,4 per cent and 1,1 per cent respectively. The regional disparities 
are also significant. For males in African rural areas the proportion that had 
never attended school was 42,0 per cent, while in urban areas it was 35,3 per 
cent. More serious than both these figures are the data relating to Africans in 
European farming areas. Here 64,1 per cent of adult males had never attended 
school, while for females the figure was 74,2 per cent. Again the percentage 
of adult males and females in rural areas who had left school after Standard VI 
was 3,0 per cent and 0,7 per cent compared to 3,9 per cent and 2,5 per cent 
for urban areas, and 1,0 per cent and 0,5 per cent in European farming areas. 
The importance of these factors becomes clearer when it is seen that the re­
sponsiveness of adults to acceptance of family planning is related to educational 
attainment. Persons with higher levels of education not only more readily 
accept the need for family planning, but are likely to use more effective tech­
niques than persons with lesser education. Data gathered by the Family Planning 
Association reveal that receptiveness has been greater in urban compared to 
rural areas and from educated persons in urban and rural areas compared to 
those of lesser educational standing. As a result the difficulty of reaching and 
getting a large, growing and widely scattered rural population to accept the 
need for family planning is increased by the distribution of the country’s educa­
tional stock. It is in the rural areas where programmes are most urgently 
required, where costs of administering programmes are highest because of 
lower densities of population, but where at present resources are most sparsely 
deployed.
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There is, however, some difficulty in deciding where returns to resource 
inputs will be greatest. If the potential declines in the birth rate are to be maxi­
mized in urban areas there may be some justification for concentrating on this 
zone rather than dissipating limited funds over a wide geographical area. What 
is required is an overall assessment from a national viewpoint and a clearly 
formulated strategy based on careful planning. Ideally, this would form the 
task of a population council attached to a government economic planning 
agency. However, there exists neither a comprehensive planning unit, nor a 
population council sponsoring a nationally financed family planning programme.
The future success of a long term plan must also be to some degree depen­
dent on the successful spread and increasing depth of education imparted to 
urban and rural African children, who are currently in the 7-15 age group. 
These persons represent a sizeable proportion of the total African population 
and despite increasing absolute financial outlays on Government current and 
capital account it is becoming apparent that little relative progress is presently 
being made to bring under the umbrella of modern education the whole of the 
potential school going population. The situation is made more serious by 
existing educational and financial policies undertaken by successive Rhodesian 
governments, particularly since 1962. In 1967 some 16,85 per cent of the African 
population, or 705 833 persons, were reported by the Ministry of Education 
to be in primary and secondary schools. An unspecified number of potential 
school children are acknowledged to be unenrolled. Reasons for this state of 
affairs range from lack of parental finance to an increasing cost of education as 
higher grades are entered, high drop-out rates as a result of inadequate facilities 
and performance, the marked imbalance in the sexes enrolled with preference 
weighted strongly in favour of males especially in the secondary tier of the 
educational system and declared government policy based on a 1965 decision 
to limit the allocation of funds for African education to 2 per cent of the gross 
national product. Also because the figure of 16,85 per cent is computed on the 
basis of the 1962 Census which by comparison to the latest data in the 1969 
Census is reckoned to have under-enumerated the population it can be taken 
that a fairly large number of children of school going age are not in school. 
The important point is simply that large numbers of children are receiving 
relatively little education (only 2,43 per cent of the total school enrolment is 
in the secondary system) with the effect that the more the spread of family 
planning practices is connected with educational standards of the population 
at large the more difficult and costly it will be in the future to promote an all 
embracing family planning programme.
A further economic phenomenon that has been suggested as a partial 
cause of high fertility rates in Rhodesia arises out of the production structure 
of the traditional sector in relation to the sex roles and division of labour 
common in traditional African society both amongst the Shona and AmaNde- 
bele groups which together constitute 85 per cent of Rhodesia’s population. 
Because certain tasks are delegated to males and others to females, and given 
that the typical unit of production is the family, there exists a demand for both 
males and females in order to maintain the labour input balance required for 
the family’s economic survival. If the size of the traditional or subsistence 
sector were rapidly reducing trends would probably work to ease the economic 
pressure for both sons and daughters and thereby possibly result in a smaller 
average family size. However, the wage employment sector, which provided 
the principal alternative economic opportunity for persons in the non-monetized 
sector of the economy, has not been expanding rapidly enough in the last 15
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years to be able to shift the centre of gravity away from traditional forms of 
economic enterprise to higher productivity wage employment in which the 
traditional need to maintain the sexual balance in the structure of the family 
is no longer imperative. The number of Africans in wage employment in 1956 
was 602 000, or 18,8 per cent of the total African population. By 1968 total 
employment was only 697 000, or 14,4 per cent of the total African population. 1° 
Thus not only is an increasing burden being borne by the wage employment 
sector, but there is relatively little progress being made in reducing the depen­
dence of the African population on subsistence economic pursuits.
Obstacles to Family Planning: Financial
The financial problems facing the Family Planning Association are basically 
twofold. The first is the inadequate amount of funds in aggregate that is avail­
able for allocation to family planning activities and the second is the question 
of how to rationally allocate these funds in order to maximize effectiveness.
Concerning the former it should be pointed out that the major agency in 
the field at present is the Family Planning Association (FPA). Initially opera­
tions began by opening up a clinic for Europeans and the total annual income 
at that stage was the paltry sum of £205. In the last 14 years its activities have 
grown rapidly. Apart from the FPA, who undertake both educational and 
medical work, the other major directly involved agencies are the central govern­
ment, missions organizations and local public authorities. Minor contributions 
are also made by private doctors and a few industrial firms. Some idea of the 
present aggregate national effort can be obtained from an analysis of the 
funding of the FPA and by comparing the size of its efforts to the total effort 
of all agencies combined. No comprehensive data are available for a fully 
accurate assessment but informed estimates20 made in 1970 suggest that in the 
educational field some 95 per cent of the work is conducted by the FPA with 
the balance being undertaken by government. On the medical side some 25 
per cent was estimated to be FPA activity, 25 per cent by Missions, 40 per cent 
by Government and 10 per cent by Local Authorities. This breakdown is 
changing fairly rapidly as there is a wider recognition of the population pro­
blem and public authorities’ contributions became more permanent and 
sizeable.
Prior to a 1966 Ministerial decision to allow government hospitals to 
dispense advice and facilities for family planning the government contribution 
was sporadic and irregular. Of the total funds available to the FPA amounting 
to £77 261 for the period 1957/8-1968/9 approximately 57 per cent were derived 
from public sector sources and 43 per cent from private donors.21 The com­
placency of government is indicated by the fact that some 88 per cent of the 
total donations of £39123 have been forthcoming in the period since 1968. 
The only satisfying feature of the public sector record is that its contributions 
can now be seen to be of a permanent nature and the allocation from the 
exchequer is increasing annually, as is the aggregate governmental effort 
through public hospitals and clinics not connected directly to the FPA. Still, 
the glaring inadequacy of such funds in relation to the problems can be esti­
mated from the number of persons reached by means of educational film units 
operated by the FPA in urban and rural areas. In 1968/69 some 56 633 persons 
participated in this programme, equivalent to about 2 per cent of the “ target” 
African population between the ages of 15 and 44 years of age. It would be 
highly optimistic to expect that the other 98 per cent had been reached by means 
of the literature campaign, household visits by FPA workers and public talks 
(often conducted with the film shows) or had on their own volition attended
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government, local authority or FPA clinics. Even if as much as 5 per cent of the 
“target” population had been in contact with family planning agencies it 
cannot be assumed that 100 per cent responded positively to the concept of 
family planning and are actively utilizing the advice and services offered.
It is clear that at the present stage financial resources for family planning 
are extremely limited. Other difficulties are reflected in the present problems 
facing the FPA, viz., shortage of qualified staff and funds to train new per­
sonnel, the high cost of dispensing services to remote rural areas and the 
present practice of implementing charges on the provision of a number of 
medical services, which although relatively small, are significant enough in 
relation to the average rural household income to deter interested persons 
from making full use of available services.
It is doubtful whether the solution to the problem is simply that of merely 
increasing contributions to the FPA. Its organization, planning and research 
facilities and medical services are not equipped for the size of the task it faces. 
Co-ordinated effort between all agencies is needed, together with substantial 
permanent support from public funds. This factor gives rise to the second 
major financial problem facing family planning in Rhodesia—the lack of 
rational planning and setting of priorities for the maximum utilization of 
existing financial resources.
A number of planning difficulties arise in attempting to formulate a family 
planning strategy for Rhodesia. Firstly there is the problem of allocating 
existing funds so as to maximize a welfare function that, for example, leads 
to the most rapid reduction in the birth rate over a given period. The choice 
of the terminal period clearly affects the intensity of the programme needed 
and thereby the amount of funds required to meet the target. But given that 
existing funds are likely to be consistently under current needs, at least in the 
immediate short run, the principal decisions at this juncture centre around the 
regional distribution of resources and in the form in which these resources 
should be provided.
Ideally, an overall cost-benefit analysis on a dynamic basis is required 
with values being ascertained for a number of important variables: (a) the 
unit cost per “ target” population of providing a given quantum of family 
planning services for different urban centres and rural communities; (b) the 
responsiveness, in terms of level of utilization of services, of the “target” 
population to given programmes in terms of the type of services used; (c) the 
rates of decline in birth rates expected in different areas (defined by either their 
rural/urban environment or by their regional birth rate levels) under given 
assumptions pertaining to different sized programmes; (d) the returns per 
unit outlay on various income groups; (e) the cost effectiveness of concentra­
tion of effort on females or males, or both, and between different age groups; 
and finally (f) expected dynamic changes in input costs for different programme 
mixes designed for various communities. Quite obviously these questions are 
not any which will be answered without a considerable degree of research and 
rational deliberation. To find quantitatively accurate answers may in fact 
prove impossible given the present limitations of data. This does not imply 
that the formulation of policies should ignore these items. The above con­
siderations are fundamental and misallocation could seriously affect the returns 
that might otherwise have been derived from a rational setting of priorities. 
At the moment there is no adequate planning mechanism, either in government 
(though it is known that there exists a Population Committee that is con­
sidering the general problem of rapid population growth), or in the existing
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organization of the FPA. Intuition provides the present criteria for choice 
of location of clinics, the distribution of the educational programme effort, 
the choice of techniques used and services offered and a relatively random 
ad hoc forward planning system covering the forthcoming budget year provides 
the maximum temporal perspective envisaged. This predicament is a direct 
result of the present state of neglect of existing needs and the relative dis­
organization that pervades in the field of family planning for national economic 
goals.
Obstacles to Family Planning: Sociological
This paper has so far been concerned with the economic and financial 
obstacles impeding the implementation of family planning in Rhodesia. This 
does not mean that sociological or political difficulties do not exist, or are 
unimportant. In fact, the contrary is true and it is worth noting that some of 
the most outstanding problems lie in the non-economic sphere. Some of these 
issues will be mentioned in what follows in an attempt to sketch a socio­
political outline of the extent to which the economic costs of family planning 
may vary with changes in the institutional order.
Some 71 per cent of Rhodesian Africans are of Shona origin with 16 per 
cent being Ndebele.22 Traditional Shona religion and the African social struc­
ture place a high priority on child-bearing. A man’s status, and in some cases 
his ‘.wealth” or welfare, is often determined by the number of children in his 
household. There therefore exists considerable societal pressure on the indivi­
dual resulting in the presence of a strong pronatalist philosophy even amongst 
urban Africans who have long left the rural areas, who may have considerable 
educational and/or economic advantages, and who may regard themselves 
as members of a technologically advanced society.
Despite the advances made in the extension of medical services there also 
exists the memory of the high pre-natal and infant mortality rates that charac­
terized the past and so parents, especially in rural areas, harbour a strong 
desire for having a large number of children.2 2 Consequently, there are strong 
deep-rooted fears of family planning goals in as far as these call for a reduction 
in family size.24 As long as such widely felt attitudes prevail a strong degree 
of resistance to family planning is likely to remain. Only through a rapid 
transformation of existing social structures can these societal controls be 
loosened. In this respect the current Community Development programme 
initiated by the Rhodesian Front administration in 1965 generates a paradoxial 
effect. One of its immediate objectives is to give increasing autonomy to local 
authorities, particularly traditional authorities under the auspices of the Chiefs, 
their Councillors and Headmen. This tends in practice to exclude the more 
innovative elements of the African society, particularly teachers, the educated 
elite and others, from the leadership function and decision-making process of 
local administration and national government. Thus community development 
attempts to promote local initiative in the growth process yet the overwhelming 
recourse to traditional authorities is unlikely to aid the cause of family planning 
because very often, though there are exceptions, the collateral succession 
procedure for the selection of Shona chiefs brings relatively elderly men to 
positions of authority and in many cases such persons through tradition, 
inherited conservatism, religion, or for other reasons, are hostile to the pressing 
need for family planning and are often reluctant to promote its cause in their 
communities.
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Obstacles to Family Planning: Political
Related to the effects of tribal leadership on the acceptance of family 
planning in the African community are the impediments provided by the 
nature of the political system and strained race relations. Because of the in­
creased polarization of race relationships and political attitudes in Rhodesia, 
and the increasing extent to which discriminatory legislation and practices 
are being promoted,25 there exists a widespread fear amongst Africans that 
family planning is part of a white plan designed to reduce the potential strength 
of the African population by reducing its numbers. A more extreme version, 
popular in African nationalist circles is that any population policy aimed at 
reducing the African birth rate is tantamount to a form of “racial genocide” . 
Any rational observer can immediately ascertain that the empirical basis of 
such a possibility is so far removed from the likely future reality of the present 
demographic position as to be without foundation. Given the existing racial 
numerical ratio of 21:1 between African and non-African, and the differential 
rates of growth between the two, it is patent that even equalization of natural 
rate of increase between the two groups would be inadequate to re-establish 
the lowest historical numerical balance that has existed in the racial ratios. 
But in the context of operative political attitudes this is not the point. Resis­
tance to family planning based on political objectives of the above nature is 
not based on rational criteria but rather is a response to the polemics and 
rhetoric of both black and white parliamentarians, laymen and misinformed 
observers whose emotional and provocative statements on the population 
question tend to be characterized by irrationality and the pursuit of short-term 
vested interests. The responsibility for drawing such an important socio-econo­
mic issue into the sphere of party and race politics must lie squarely on the 
shoulders of politicians and to some extent on their electorate. On this matter 
the government do not possess a clear record. Ministerial statements have on 
several occasions provoked irrational fears by ill-informed references to popu­
lation problems. This is especially emphasized when related to the contentious 
non-selective and racially discriminatory immigration policy that is presently 
operated. Indeed, a recent report on economic planning for the development of 
Rhodesia which suggested that “In the interests of the Rhodesian economy, 
and especially of the African inhabitants, it is essential that the European 
community be strengthened, and the numerical imbalance prevented from 
increasing unduly” 26 is typical of cases where value judgement has been sub­
stituted for economic analysis. It is significant that the “imbalance” is cast in 
terms of racial stock ratios rather than in terms of “economic” phenomena 
such as skilled/unskilled or educated/uneducated persons, with the result 
that varying prescriptive policies follow from the acceptance of the different 
premises involved. In the face of statements of this sort on what are delicate 
issues it is not surprising that harsh reaction is encountered and politicians 
favouring African nationalism openly claim that family planning is part of an 
overall attempt by the minority white government to enforce political control. 
As a consequence the government has been unwilling to overtly commit itself 
to a large scale, nationally financed and administered family planning pro­
gramme. In fact, if it did there is no guarantee that in present circumstances 
political resistance would render it ineffective and inflict long term damage on 
future family planning programmes. The latest government action in this 
regard has been the insistence that the government be allowed representation 
and “control” on the executive board of the FPA. It is likely that this closer 
identification of government with a voluntary association will further reduce 
the political credibility of the FPA amongst the recipient African population.2 7
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This overall political situation explains to a considerable degree the lacka­
daisical response that the FPA has received from government quarters and the 
general under-investment of resources in family planning. The lack of a homo­
genous national consciousness and prolongation for an indefinite period28 
of a system in which genuine African participation in the central government is 
both limited and subordinate militates against any easy solutions being found 
to the political problems that confront present family planning efforts.
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